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Abstract
In a simple New Keynesian model, we derive a closed form solution for the inflation
persistence parameter as a function of the policy weights in the central bank’s Taylor
rule. By estimating the time-varying weights that the FED attaches to inflation
and the output gap, we show that the empirically observed changes in U.S. inflation
persistence during the period 1975 to 2010 can be well explained by changes in the
conduct of monetary policy. Our findings are in line with Benati’s (2008) view that
inflation persistence should not be considered a structural parameter in the sense
of Lucas.
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1 Introduction
The degree of U.S. inflation persistence varied considerably during the last forty years
(Cogley and Sargent, 2005, Cogley et al., 2010, and Kang et al., 2009). While inflation
persistence was high during the 1970s, it fell sharply in the early 1980s and, thereafter,
remained at a considerably lower level than in the 1970s. It is often informally argued
that the observed changes in persistence are related to changes in the FED’s monetary
policy (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 2000). In particular, the strong decline in persistence
in the early 1980s is associated with the Volcker disinflation. In this paper, we analyze
the link between a Taylor rule for monetary policy and inflation persistence in a simple
New Keynesian type of model, which allows for a closed form solution of the inflation
persistence parameter as a function of the weights that the central bank attaches to
inflation and the output gap.
Our model can be considered a closed-economy version of the model discussed in
Clarida and Waldman (2008). It consists of three equations: a forward looking aggregate
demand curve, a backward looking supply curve and a standard Taylor rule. In this
setting, the reduced form representation of the inflation rate is a stationary autoregressive
process of order one. The degree of inflation persistence, which is given by the first order
autoregressive coefficient, strictly decreases in the Taylor rule coefficient on the deviation
of inflation from its target and strictly increases in the Taylor rule coefficient on the output
gap. That is, our model predicts that the more aggressively the central bank reacts to
deviations of inflation from its target, the faster does the inflation rate converge to the
target. This central property of our model is then tested empirically for the U.S.
In a first step, we estimate a forward looking Taylor rule for a rolling window of twenty
years of quarterly observations. The estimated weights on inflation and the output gap
reveal substantial variation during the period 1975:Q1 to 2010:Q1. In particular, we find
the highest weight on inflation during the early years of the Volcker era. For that period
the output gap coefficient estimate was insignificant, but significantly positive thereafter.
In a second step, we obtain rolling window estimates of the degree of inflation persistence.
Interestingly, the estimated persistence was lowest in the period for which we estimated
the highest values for the reaction coefficient on inflation. Also, inflation persistence
increased during a period in which the FED increased its weight on the output gap. A
more formal test of our model’s implications is performed by regressing the estimated
inflation persistence on the estimated reaction coefficients on inflation and the output
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gap. In line with the model’s predictions, we find that a higher weight on inflation (the
output gap) significantly decreases (increases) inflation persistence. Finally, we utilize
the estimated reaction coefficients to generate a series of inflation persistence measures
as predicted by our theoretical model and then compare this series with the actually
observed inflation persistence. Again, the predictions of the model are confirmed by the
observed data.
In summary, our empirical analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that the changes
in U.S. inflation persistence can be well explained by changes in the conduct of the FED’s
monetary policy. Our findings can be considered complementary to other recent evidence
provided by, e.g., Carlstrom et al. (2008), Davig and Doh (2009) and Kang et al. (2009).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
model and derive a closed form solution for the inflation persistence parameter. Section 3
presents the data and the empirical analysis. A short discussion closes the paper.
2 Theoretical Model
We consider a simple New Keynesian model consisting of three equations: aggregate
demand, aggregate supply and a monetary policy rule that specifies how the central bank
sets the interest rate as a function of the output gap and of deviations of inflation from
its target. Our model is motivated by Clarida and Waldman (2008) and can be viewed
as a closed economy version of their model. The simple structure of the model allows us
to investigate how changes in monetary policy (changes in the weights in the monetary
policy rule) affect the degree of inflation persistence in the reduced form solution of the
model.
Let aggregate demand be given by
yt = Et {yt+1} − (it −Et {pit+1}) + ut, (1)
where yt is the output gap, it the nominal interest rate, Et {pit+1} expected inflation,
and ut a demand shock which is assumed to be white noise. The nominal interest rate is
linked to the real rate through the Fisher equation it = rt+Et {pit+1}. The forward looking
aggregate demand equation (1) can be derived by log-linearizing the consumption Euler
equation that arises from the household’s optimal savings decision.1 Following Clarida
1See, for example, Woodford (1996) or Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998).
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and Waldman (2008), aggregate supply is given by
pit = pit−1 + yt + et, (2)
where et is a white-noise aggregate supply shock (“cost-push” shock). Two comments
are in order. First, we assume that the coefficients on lagged inflation and on the output
gap are both equal one. This assumption simplifies our model but does not affect its
qualitative predictions. We will discuss the implications of this assumption in more detail
in Section 3.2. Second, the aggregate supply curve is assumed to be backward looking,
that is, current inflation depends on lagged inflation. In the literature, both backward
and forward looking aggregate supply curves are common. A purely forward looking
aggregate supply curve is not appropriate for our setting because it does not generate the
degree of inflation persistence we typically observe in the data.2 A compromise would be
a “hybrid” aggregate supply curve in which both lagged and expected inflation appear on
the right hand side. The reason why we focus on a backward looking aggregate supply
curve (sometimes called an “accelerationist” Phillips curve) is that it allows for a simple
closed form solution of the inflation persistence parameter.
We close the model by assuming that the central bank conducts monetary policy
according to the following Taylor rule
it = γ0 + γπ(Et {pit+1} − p¯i) + γyyt, (3)
where p¯i is the central bank’s inflation target. Under this forward looking rule, policy
responds to the current output gap and to expected deviations of inflation from the
target. The constant γ0 is, by construction, the desired nominal interest rate, when both
inflation and output are at their target levels. Taylor rules of this type are standard in
the literature and are in line with the optimal rules derived, for example, in Clarida at
al. (1999). The weight on the output gap is assumed to be positive (γy > 0) and the
weight on inflation is assumed to be greater than one (γπ > 1). The assumption that
γπ > 1, is referred to as the Taylor condition and is necessary for a stable solution. To
get an intuition for this principle, use the Fisher equation above and rewrite the policy
rule in terms of the real rate
rt = (γ0 − p¯i) + (γπ − 1) (Et {pit+1} − p¯i) + γyyt.
2Cogley et al. (2008) show that even a forward looking supply curve can generate sufficient persistence,
when inflation is replaced by the inflation gap, i.e. the difference between the actual inflation and the
time-varying trend inflation.
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The Taylor condition states that the central bank needs to respond more than one for one
to deviations of expected inflation from the target in order for the real rate to rise. The
term (γ0 − p¯i) corresponds to the long-run equilibrium real interest rate.
In the following proposition we show that the reduced form representation of the
inflation rate is an autoregressive process of order one (AR(1)). Following Pivetta and
Reis (2005), we then measure inflation persistence by the autoregressive coefficient.3
Proposition 1. If the Taylor condition is satisfied and if the weight on the output gap
is positive, there exists - conditional on the minimum set of state variables - a unique
rational expectations solution of the form
pit = c+ dpit−1 + κt, (4)
where c is a constant, κt is white noise and the persistence parameter d can be expressed
as
d =
√
2χ+ χ2 −
1
γπ
− χ, (5)
where χ ≡ (2 + γy)/(2γπ).
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in the Appendix. For analyzing the effects of
changes in γπ and γy on the persistence parameter d, take the partial derivatives to find:
∂d
∂γπ
< 0 <
∂d
∂γy
(6)
Thus, inflation persistence is strictly decreasing in γπ, the Taylor rule coefficient on the
inflation gap, and strictly increasing in γy, the Taylor rule coefficient on the output gap.
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The more aggressively the central bank reacts to the inflation gap, the faster the inflation
rate converges to its long-run value (the target). However, the larger the weight placed
on output stabilization, the higher the degree of inflation persistence. In the limit, when
γπ approaches one and when γy increases indefinitely, inflation approaches a random
walk (d→ 1). On the other hand, as the weight on inflation goes to infinity, inflation
approaches a white noise process (d→ 0). Figure 1 plots the persistence parameter d as
a function of γπ, while γy is fixed at 0.1, 0.5 and 1.0 respectively. Note, that the effect of
a change in γπ on d is stronger, the smaller the initial value of γπ.
3As discussed in Pivetta and Reis (2005) this measure can be viewed as an unconditional measure
of persistence. In contrast, conditional persistence measures would be derived from equations that in
addition to lagged inflation include other explanatory variables. Since we are interested in measuring
persistence and not predictability we focus on the former.
4Note, that this result is qualitatively the same as in Clarida and Waldman (2008).
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Figure 1: Inflation persistence d (y-axis) as a function of the reaction coefficient γπ (x-
axis) with γy fixed at 0.1 (solid line), 0.5 (dashed line) and 1.0 (dotted line).
3 Empirical Analysis
In the following section, we will empirically test the implications of our theoretical model
using U.S. data. For the estimation of the forward looking Taylor rule, we will employ
inflation expectations data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Regarding
the output gap, we follow Orphanides (2004) and rely on real-time instead of revised data.
That is, we make use of the data available to the FED at the time the monetary policy
decisions were made. Since the survey respondents participating in the SPF are asked
about their expectations regarding the GDP deflator, we also use the GDP deflator for
estimating our measures of inflation persistence.
3.1 Data
We employ quarterly data for the period 1975:Q1 to 2010:Q1. The federal funds rate (it)
and the GDP deflator (pt) data are obtained from the FRED database at the Federal
Reserve of St. Louis. Inflation expectations are constructed as either annualized one-
quarter-ahead predictions pˆit+1|t or one-year-ahead predictions pˆit+4|t.
5 The corresponding
realized inflation rates are calculated as pit+1,t = 400 × [log(pt+1) − log(pt)] and pit+4,t =
5The expectations data are collected in the second month of each quarter. The SPF has set the
deadline for the responses at late in the second to third week of the second month. The data we are using
are the median expectations among the survey participants.
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100 × [log(pt+4) − log(pt)], respectively. The real-time output data were retrieved from
the Federal Reserve of Philadelphia. For each vintage the output gap is calculated as
the deviation of actual output from a quadratic time trend.6 Since the real-time dataset
contains estimates for output in quarter t − 1 (and before) based on information up to
quarter t, we obtain a real-time output gap series yt−1|t by collecting the last observations
from each vintage.7 In order to obtain estimates for quarter t, we fit an AR(2) model to
the series yt−1|t and construct yˆt|t as the one-step-ahead predictions.
3.2 Estimation Results
We begin the empirical analysis by estimating a standard Taylor rule of the form
it = γ0 + γπ(pˆit+k|t − p¯i) + γyyˆt|t + εt, (7)
where εt is a stochastic innovation.
8 Throughout the analysis we set the inflation target
p¯i equal to 2%.9 In order to control for the effects of the different time horizons k on
the estimation results, we consider two specifications: a first one which employs the one-
year-ahead inflation expectations (yˆt+4|t) and a second one which employs the annualized
one-quarter-ahead inflation expectations (yˆt+1|t). The results for the whole sample, i.e. for
the period 1975:Q1 - 2010:Q1, are presented in the second and third column of Table 1
and provide reasonable estimates for the inflation and output gap reaction coefficients. In
both cases the reaction coefficient on inflation is well above one, i.e. satisfies the Taylor
principle, and the reaction coefficient on the output gap is significantly greater than zero.
Note, that the estimates of γπ and γy are quite close to 1.5 and 0.5, the values suggested
in Taylor (1993). Columns four and five contain estimates for the Volcker era and the
post-Volcker period (both for k = 4). Interestingly during the Volcker years the coefficient
on the output gap is virtually zero and statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the
coefficient on inflation is highly significant and close to 1.5. Thus, our estimates for the
6For a discussion of alternative methods for estimating the output gap see Orphanides and van Norden
(2002).
7The “advance” estimate of GDP in quarter t is released near the end of the first month in quarter
t+ 1.
8As an alternative to equation (7), we also considered a specification which allows for interest rate
smoothing and obtained similar results. However, in order to be as close as possible to our theoretical
model introduced in Section 2, we prefer to work with the simpler specification.
9Since we are only interested in identifying the parameters γπ and γy, this assumption is innocuous
because it only affects the constant γ0.
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Volker era are in line with the usual interpretation that in these years the focus of the
FED’s policy was on inflation. During the post-Volcker years both reaction coefficients
are highly significant and even slightly higher than in the whole sample. That is, in the
post-Volcker years the FED shifted its focus to both inflation and growth. Clearly, the
sub-sample analysis shows that the FED’s monetary policy changed considerably over
time (see also Clarida et al., 2000).
Table 1: Taylor Rule Reaction Coefficient Estimates.
1975:Q1-2010:Q1 Volcker post-Volcker 79:Q4-10:Q1 80:Q3-10:Q1
pˆit+4|t pˆit+1|t pˆit+4|t pˆit+4|t pˆit+4|t pˆit+1|t
γ0 2.876
(0.341)
⋆⋆⋆ 3.179
(0.370)
⋆⋆⋆ 4.833
(0.811)
⋆⋆⋆ 2.536
(0.304)
⋆⋆⋆ 2.746
(0.300)
⋆⋆⋆ 2.991
(0.309)
⋆⋆⋆
γπ 1.589
(0.208)
⋆⋆⋆ 1.442
(0.191)
⋆⋆⋆ 1.619
(0.269)
⋆⋆⋆ 1.873
(0.212)
⋆⋆⋆ 2.025
(0.165)
⋆⋆⋆ 2.001
(0.142)
⋆⋆⋆
γy 0.321
(0.098)
⋆⋆⋆ 0.331
(0.110)
⋆⋆⋆ 0.011
(0.133)
0.436
(0.073)
⋆⋆⋆ 0.344
(0.067)
⋆⋆⋆ 0.364
(0.079)
⋆⋆⋆
R¯2 0.70 0.66 0.72 0.78 0.86 0.83
Notes: The table shows the parameter estimates for the Taylor rule given in equation (7). The columns
refer to different sample periods and different choices of k in pˆit+k|t. The first row presents the periods
for which the model is estimated. The columns “Volcker” and “post-Volker” contain the estimations
for the samples 1979:Q3-1987:Q3 and 1987:Q4-2010:Q1. The numbers in parenthesis are Newey-West
robust standard errors. ⋆⋆⋆, ⋆⋆ and ⋆ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Next, we investigate the changes of the reaction coefficients in the FED’s Taylor rule in
more detail. For this, the estimation of the Taylor rule is performed for a rolling window of
M observations, which leads to a series of estimates (γˆ1π, γˆ
1
y), . . . , (γˆ
M
π , γˆ
M
y ). Figure 2 shows
the estimates for γiπ and γ
i
y from regressions with M = 80, which corresponds to twenty
years of quarterly observations.10 Note, that the estimates denoted by γˆ75:Q1π and γˆ
75:Q1
y
are based on observations ranging from 1975:Q1 to 1995:Q1. Similarly, the final estimates
γˆ90:Q1π and γˆ
90:Q1
y are based on observations ranging from 1990:Q1 to 2010:Q1. The upper
panel of Figure 2 is based on data with k = 4 (one-year-ahead inflation expectations), the
lower panel on data with k = 1 (annualized one-quarter-ahead inflation expectations).
For both choices of k the estimates of γiπ are steadily increasing from a value of about
10In choosing M one faces a trade-off between obtaining precise estimates of the reaction coefficients
on the one hand and detecting changes in the coefficients as quickly as possible on the other hand. Our
choice of M = 80 balances the two desires.
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1.5 when i = 1975:Q1 and reach a maximum of about 2.2 (2.0) when i = 1982:Q1 (i =
1981:Q2), respectively.11 Interestingly, the steepest increase in γiπ occurs when we use a
sample that begins in the early eighties (i.e. does not contain data from the seventies).
Thus, this strong increase coincides with the period of the Volcker disinflation starting
in 1979:Q3. Thereafter, the estimates for γiπ are slightly decreasing but remain at a level
well above 1.5. With k = 4 (k = 1) the estimates for γiy are insignificant before i =
1979:Q4 (1980:Q3) and significantly positive thereafter. The estimate for γiy is steadily
increasing towards a value of about 0.5 when i = 1984:Q1 and then remains at this level.
In summary, the rolling window estimates of the reaction coefficients provide strong
support for the existence of time-varying weights in the FED’s Taylor rule. Hence, com-
bining the parameter estimates with the predictions of our theoretical model, we would
expect that γiπ should have a strong negative effect on inflation persistence in the period
i = 1975:Q1, . . . , 1982:Q1 for k = 4 (i = 1975:Q1, . . . , 1981:Q2 for k = 1), but a positive
although considerably weaker effect thereafter. On the other hand, we would expect no
effect from γiy before i = 1979:Q4 (i = 1980:Q3), but a positive and significant effect
until 1984. In columns six and seven of Table 1 we present the Taylor rule parameter
estimates for the periods in which γˆy was significant in the rolling window regressions. In
these periods γπ is estimated to be 2.0, i.e. higher than in the whole sample, and γy is
estimated around 0.35. Note, that in the two sub-samples the adjusted R2 is considerably
higher than in the full sample.
Next, we construct our empirical measure of inflation persistence. We model the
inflation series as an AR(p) process
pit+k,t = φ0 + φ1pit+k−1,t−1 + . . .+ φppit+k−p,t−p + ηt (8)
and define inflation persistence as the sum of estimated autoregressive coefficients, i.e.
dˆ = φˆ1 + . . .+ φˆp. (9)
We estimate the AR(p) model by OLS and – on the basis of standard information criteria
– choose p = 1 for the year-to-year inflation rates and p = 4 for the annualized quarterly
11At first sight, it may be surprising that γiπ is estimated to be greater than one for i < 1979:Q3 already,
while studies such as Clarida et al. (2000) have shown that the FED’s behavior was “accommodative” in
the pre-Volcker years. However, one has to recall that, e.g., γˆ75:Q1π is based on observations from 1975:Q1
to 1995:Q1 and, hence, only the first four years of this period are from the pre-Volcker era. When we
perform a recursive estimation (instead of the rolling window), we also find that γˆπ is below one before
1980.
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Figure 2: Estimates of γπ (solid) and γy (squares) with corresponding 95% confidence
bands (dashed) for k = 4 (upper panel) and k = 1 (lower panel). Using inflation expec-
tations with k = 4 (k = 1) γˆy is insignificant for i < 1979:Q4 (1980:Q3), but significant
thereafter (shaded area).
inflation rates. When p = 1 the empirical measure of inflation persistence coincides with
the theoretical one derived in Section 2. Again, performing the estimation for the rolling
sample leads to a series dˆ1, . . . , dˆM of persistence parameters. Figure 3 shows the estimated
degree of persistence for pit+4,t (with p = 1) and pit+1,t (with p = 4). The estimated values
dˆi are starting at a high level of persistence and then sharply decrease until they reach
a minimum for i = 1981:Q4 (1981:Q2). The sharp decrease occurs exactly in the period
for which γπ was estimated to be strongly increasing. The minimum degree of inflation
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Figure 3: Inflation persistence measured from pit+4,t with p = 1 (upper panel) and pit+1,t
with p = 4 (lower panel). The lowest degree of inflation persistence is reached for i =
1981:Q4 (1981:Q2).
persistence is reached when the reaction coefficient on inflation was approximately at its
maximum value. Thereafter, inflation persistence is again increasing but towards a lower
level than in the mid-seventies. The increase in inflation persistence now coincides with
the raising value of γˆy until the mid-1980s. The fact that inflation persistence stabilizes
from the mid-1980s onwards is in line with the observation that thereafter both γˆπ and
γˆy remained stable. Thus, the visual inspection of Figures 2 and 3 appears to support
the theoretical predictions of our model. As expected, the degree of persistence estimated
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from pit+4,t is generally higher than that estimated from pit+1,t.
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As a more formal check of our theory we run the regression
dˆi = δ0 + δπγˆ
i
π + δyγˆ
i
y + ξ
i, (10)
i = 1, . . . ,M , and then test whether δπ < 0 and δy > 0. Table 2 shows that for all
specifications δˆπ is negative and highly significant. That is, in line with our theory,
inflation persistence is lower the stronger the central bank reacts to deviations of actual
inflation from the target. The estimate δˆy is positive and significant at the 5% level in
the specification based on pˆit+4|t, but insignificant in the specification based on pˆit+1|t. As
before, we rerun both regressions for the periods in which γˆy was found to be significant in
the rolling window regressions. The resulting estimates of δy are positive and significant
(at the 5% and 10% level). Thus, our estimation results support the hypothesis that
increases in γˆπ (γˆy) lower (raise) the degree of inflation persistence.
For checking the robustness of our results with respect to changes in the estimation
procedure of the persistence measure, we re-estimate the autoregressive parameters (i) by
the approximately median unbiased estimator of Andrews and Chen (1994) and (ii) by
assuming that ηt follows a GARCH(1, 1) process. The results are presented in Table 2
for the full sample with k = 4.13 Clearly, the parameter estimates confirm our previous
findings of a negative (positive) effect of γπ (γy) on d.
In order to connect our parameter estimates more closely to the theoretical framework,
we use the estimates of the Taylor rule coefficients, (γˆiπ, γˆ
i
y), i = 1, . . . ,M , to construct
a series of persistence parameters dˆi,M(γˆiπ, γˆ
i
y) as predicted by the theoretical model in
Section 2. Then we compare the model-implied persistence with the empirical estimates
dˆi. While the solid line in Figure 4 corresponds to dˆi, the dashed line represents dˆi,M as
stated in equation (5) but with the theoretical parameters (γiπ, γ
i
y) replaced by (γˆ
i
π, γˆ
i
y).
The general shape of dˆi,M is quite similar to the one of dˆi, however the decrease in model-
implied persistence in the late seventies and early eighties is much less sharp than the
strong decline in dˆi. A likely explanation for this effect is that in the calculation of dˆi,M the
estimated coefficients on the output gap enter even in the period in which this coefficient
12Although economically significant, the observed changes in the degree of inflation persistence could
be viewed as being small relative to the overall level of persistence. Because of this observation, e.g.,
Pivetta and Reis (2007) or Stock and Watson (2007) argue that U.S. inflation persistence did not change
significantly during the period under consideration.
13The results for k = 1 are similar and omitted for brevity.
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Table 2: Empirical Test of Model Predictions
1975:Q1-2010:Q1 79:Q4-10:Q1 80:Q3-10:Q1 75:Q1-10:Q1
pˆit+4|t pˆit+1|t pˆit+4|t pˆit+1|t MUE GARCH
δ0 1.263
(0.075)
⋆⋆⋆ 1.371
(0.104)
⋆⋆⋆ 1.378
(0.072)
⋆⋆⋆ 1.170
(0.172)
⋆⋆⋆ 1.272
(0.073)
⋆⋆⋆ 1.255
(0.057)
⋆⋆⋆
δπ −0.178
(0.045)
⋆⋆⋆ −0.309
(0.072)
⋆⋆⋆ −0.237
(0.041)
⋆⋆⋆ −0.237
(0.081)
⋆⋆⋆ −0.170
(0.046)
⋆⋆⋆ −0.171
(0.031)
⋆⋆⋆
δy 0.066
(0.030)
⋆⋆ 0.011
(0.058)
0.074
(0.031)
⋆⋆ 0.134
(0.080)
⋆ 0.106
(0.033)
⋆⋆⋆ 0.054
(0.023)
⋆⋆
R¯2 0.66 0.75 0.70 0.43 0.60 0.59
Notes: The table shows the estimates for the coefficients in equation (10). The first row presents
the periods for which the model is estimated. MUE (GARCH) refer to the situation in which dˆi
is estimated with the median unbiased estimator (conditionally heteroskedastic innovations). The
numbers in parenthesis are Newey-West robust standard errors. ⋆⋆⋆, ⋆⋆ and ⋆ indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
was not significant.14
Thus, for obtaining a better understanding of the individual contribution of γˆiπ and γˆ
i
y
to the model-implied persistence, we plot the model-implied persistence for the case that
only γˆiπ is varying and γ
i
y is fixed at 0.5 (dˆ
i,M(γˆiπ, 0.5), dotted line) or that γˆ
i
y is varying
and γˆiπ is fixed at 1.5 (dˆ
i,M(1.5, γˆiy), squares). Clearly, the dotted line closely follows the
behavior of the solid line until inflation persistence reaches its minimum, i.e. when we
fix γiy the changes in γˆ
i
π can explain the sharp decrease in inflation persistence towards
the early eighties. Similarly, the subsequent increase in dˆi is reflected in the increase of
dˆi,M(1.5, γˆiy) (squares). This is the effect of an increasing weight on the output gap while
holding the weight on inflation constant. In summary, as suggested by our theoretical
model changes in the conduct of monetary policy can explain the changes in inflation
persistence. More specifically, the sharp decrease in inflation persistence at the beginning
of the eighties was a result of the aggressive disinflation policy in the Volcker era, while
persistence is moderately increasing thereafter because of an increasing weight that was
put on the output gap.
14Note that the absolute levels of the two persistence measures differ considerably. While capturing
the general shape quite well, the model-implied persistence is lower than the estimated one throughout
the sample period. This low level of the model-implied persistence is caused by our assumption of unit
coefficients on lagged inflation and the output gap in the aggregate supply curve in eq. (2). Adjusting
these coefficients appropriately, we would obtain similar levels of persistence from both measures.
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Figure 4: Empirical and model implied inflation persistence. Solid line: dˆi, dashed line:
dˆi,M(γˆiπ, γˆ
i
y), dotted line: dˆ
i,M(γˆiπ, 0.5), squares: dˆ
i,M(1.5, γˆiy).
4 Discussion
This paper studies how monetary policy affects inflation persistence. U.S. inflation per-
sistence has declined considerably since the early 1980s and one explanation for this phe-
nomenon is that the Federal Reserve responded more aggressively to inflationary pressure.
In a simple three equation model we derive a closed form solution of the inflation per-
sistence parameter and show how it is affected by the weights in the FED’s Taylor rule.
Inflation persistence is strictly decreasing in the coefficient on the output gap and strictly
increasing in the coefficient on inflation. The more aggressively the central bank reacts
to inflationary shocks, the faster the inflation rate converges to its target. However, the
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larger the weight placed on output stabilization, the higher inflation persistence.
The predictions of the theoretical model are confirmed by our empirical analysis. Us-
ing simple rolling window regressions, we obtain time-varying parameter estimates of the
Taylor rule reaction coefficients on inflation and the output gap and the degree of U.S. in-
flation persistence. It is then shown that increases in the response coefficient on inflation
(the output gap) significantly decrease (increase) inflation persistence. By comparing the
empirically estimated changes in U.S. inflation persistence with the persistence implied by
our model, we can show that the sharp decrease in inflation persistence in the early 1980s
can be attributed to a strong increase in the weight that the FED attached to inflation
during the Volcker disinflation.
It is worth mentioning, that while in our model we treat inflation persistence as be-
ing endogenous, there is also a strand of the literature that treats inflation persistence
as a structural parameter. Under this assumption, the optimal reaction coefficients in
the Taylor rule are functions of the degree of inflation persistence (see, e.g., Clarida et
al., 1999). However, as suggested by Benati (2008), the question whether persistence
is structural or not can only be judged empirically by investigating inflation persistence
over different policy regimes. Our results thus deliver further support for the view that
inflation persistence is not a structural parameter.
Finally, we would like to link our findings to another ongoing debate, namely the
discussion on the sources of the Great Moderation, i.e. the strong decline in the volatility
of many macroeconomic series – including inflation – from the mid-1980s onwards. Since
in our model the reduced form inflation rate follows an autoregressive process, changes
on the degree of persistence directly affect the unconditional variance of the process. A
monetary policy which decreases the degree of inflation persistence (while holding the
variance of the innovation term constant) also reduces the volatility of the inflation rate.
Thus, our analysis also provides evidence for the good policy interpretation of the Great
Moderation.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
In order to derive equation (4), we reduce the three equation model above to a second
order difference equation in pi of the form
−a0Et {pit+1}+ pit − a1pit−1 = xt, (11)
where a0 and a1 are functions of γy and γπ
a0 ≡
2− γπ
2 + γy
and a1 ≡
1 + γy
2 + γy
and xt ≡
ut+(1+γy)et−γ0+γpiπ¯
2+γy
. It is then straightforward to solve equation (11), for example,
by factorization. The result will be of the form
pit = c+ dpit−1 + κt,
where d is the stable root of
γπd
2 +
(
2 + γy
)
d−
(
1 + γy
)
= 0, (12)
c is some constant and κt a white-noise innovation. Note that the two roots of equa-
tion (12) are given by d1 + d2 =
1
a0
and d1d2 =
a1
a0
. The model is saddle path stable
with one root larger and the other smaller than one. By choosing d to be the smaller of
the two roots, we are choosing the stable, non-explosive solution. The constant and the
innovation are given by
c =
γπp¯i − γ0(
2 + γy
)
− (2− γπ) d
and
κt =
1(
2 + γy
)
− (2− γπ) d
ut +
1 + γy(
2 + γy
)
− (2− γπ) d
et.
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